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![]() I suggested to the PRA group that on-ground analytic problemsContributed to something like 1.3 of the 2.0 accidents in the 113 flights. In the case of the Columbia, better analysis andDecision-making during the flight might have yielded rescue efforts to try toSave the crew, which was endangered by damage to the Columbia suffered at launch. In the case of the Challenger, the analytic process on theDay before the accident was seriously deficient, in the sense that-in hindsight to beSure-the Challenger would not have been launched on that very cold day (whichCompromised the O-rings and caused the accident) if smarter engineering analysis andBetter decision-making had taken place. ThisWas designed to replace their chippy and twiddly PP slides, which made a hash of their good technical work and made it difficult to assess the overall risk context.(2) The PRA assessments did not take into account a major risk factor in bothThe Challenger and Columbia accidents: on-ground intellectual failures in engineeringAnalysis. LetThat intense matrix, backed up by similar more-detailed 11" by 17" arrays of riskEstimates, be the main presentation device and analytical tool for making decisions. PRA works with a list of possible threats, estimates their probablilities and expected losses, and then seeks to assist decision-making for shuttle risk-reduction.After the PRA group presented their results, I had two major suggestions:(1) They should prepare a detailed summary matrix (on, of course, 11" by 17" paper), ordering theRisks and providing, in a comments column, relevant background for each estimate. The current risk number is a cloudy 1 in 100, which isRisky but has been acceptable in the past. The on-ground factors that contributed to1.3 shuttle losses appear to be mitigated by the thorough analysis for this flight. I would vote for the launch. It was also a contested decision. The shuttle itself was considerably less riskyThan what was happening on the ground in decision-making about the shuttle.At the meeting, I also handed out Richard Feynman's famous discussion of shuttle risks, which Feynman prepared as a part of the Challenger investigation in 1987.The analysis for the upcoming launch of the Discovery in July 2006, as the link above indicates, was an intense evaluation of risks and trade-offs.On the basis of reading some of the public documentation (and no direct knowledge) for the upcoming flight inThe last few weeks, I think that NASA has made a reasonable and well-informed decision for the upcomingFlight. Powerpoint Error There Was An Error Accessing /Volumes Pdf File ShouldIn the main report, there is a persistent habit ofDequantification and a general absence of units of measurement. "Here is the PP deck for "STS-121, Flight Readiness Review, External Tank Project (ET-119)."(This pdf file should be up in a separate window to read in parallel with the comments below.)These slides summarize the results of the enormous amount of resources (probably >$1 billion, some estimates are much higher) devoted to the external tank foam problem.The slides do not display a sense of engineering intelligence or discipline. This rescue scenario is itself troublesome, since the rescue launch must quickly take into account what caused the need for the Discovery crew-rescue in the first place.POWERPOINT FOR DISCOVERY FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW: THE FOAM SLIDES, OR "MAKE THAT CALL NOW, THAT'S 1-800-. Having flown once in 3+ years, the shuttle program might well collapse if unable to fly soon (within a year or so), or if there is another accident even if the crew escaped unharmed. All this stuff on one over-produced but importantslide.In real science, every photograph has a scale of measurement built right in to the photograph. Students of PP design might, however, appreciate the 5 sets of orange drop-shadows, 4 wavy-purple color fields, 3 unintentionally 3D blue time-lines, 2 overactive grids, and floating-off-in-space bullets in the highlight box (with an arbitrary change from dots to dashes midstream in the box). But PP's lightweight resolution and lousy design tools compromise the summary slide. The good idea is to have an intense and fairly detailed summary early in the presentation. Several of the slides look like they were produced by a designer lacking in scientific training.The key overview slide (page 3) is a very good idea but a presentation mess. Star wars the force unleashed 2 downloadIt is as if each and every slide has to remind the viewer what the presentation is about. Are we doing engineering analysis or marketing here? Some 20%Of the space of every slide (already a a very low resolution display method) is devoted to branding and to the boxed-in awkward and repetitive slide titles. The branding with 3 logos on every slide (the title slide has 4 logos) is unprofessional, pitchy,Turfy. (Even the shuttle close-out photos, just about the most documentary type of photographs one can imagine, have no scales of measurement and no rulers in the pictures.)The bullet lists tend somewhat to be base-touching grunts, which show effects without causes, actions without actors, verbs without subjects, and nouns without predicates. ![]()
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